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DEVELOPMENTS
cheaper in the six other countries of the EMS as well as in the United
States. By making exports from France and Italy more competitive while
simultaneously decreasing their imports, the realignment could help these
countries reduce large trade deficits and restore international confidence
in their currencies. These changes should also enable France and Italy to
start reducing the high interest rates they were forced to adopt to prevent
the flight of capital to other countries. In addition, inflationary tendencies
in West Germany and the Netherlands should be reduced as a result,
while the French franc should gain in strength. Finally, the realignment
will discourage investment in the U.S. dollar-a very favorable haven due
to high U.S. interest rates-and relieve the criticism levelled at U.S. fiscal
policy. Hopefully, realignment may also lessen the counterattacks
launched by Washington in defense of its policies.
J.H. W.Jr.
Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A.:
Sovereign Immunity And The Constitutional
Right To Jury Trial
Three circuit courts of appeal' recently considered the seventh
amendment right' to jury trial in conjunction with actions brought under
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA).' Specifically, the
courts addressed whether all actions brought pursuant to the FSIA must
be tried to the court without a jury, and whether the Act is the sole basis
for federal subject matter jurisdiction in civil actions against agencies or
instrumentalities of foreign sovereigns. More importantly, the courts con-
sidered whether, if the answers to both of the above questions are in the
affirmative, the FSIA is consistent with the seventh amendment guaran-
joined the European Community on January 1, 1981, but has not linked its drachma to the
system even though it has signed the basic EMS agreements. Wall St. J., Mar. 16, 1981, at
26, col. 2.
1. See Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India, 653 F.2d 875 (4th Cir. 1981), and Ruggerio
v. Compania Pervana De Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui," 639 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1981),
wherein the courts affirmed district court orders striking jury demands on grounds consis-
tent with those of Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A., 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981).
2. The seventh amendment states in relevant part: "In Suits at common law, where the
value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved.
." U.S. CoNasT. amend. VII. '
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976).
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tee of civil jury trial.
Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A.," the most recent of the three
cases, involved Calvin Rex, a longshoreman who was injured while un-
loading cargo from a ship of Compania Pervana De Vapores, S.A., a Peru-
vian corporation whose stock is wholly owned by the government of Peru.
Calvin Rex filed suit for damages under section 5(b) of the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation ActG alleging federal subject
matter jurisdiction on the grounds of diversity of citizenship,6 a federal
question,7 and an action against a foreign sovereign. 8 A request for a jury
trial was included in the claim for relief. The district court granting the
demand for a jury trial' was reversed on interlocutory appeal by the
Third Circuit on grounds of congressional intent and interpretation of the
seventh amendment right to jury trial. In so doing, the Third Circuit
agreed with the conclusions reached by the Second and Fourth Circuits in
Ruggerio v. Compania Pervana De Vapores "Inca Capac Yupanqui" and
Williams v. Shipping Corp. of India,0 but arrived at its decision by a
slightly different route.
The courts in Ruggerio and Williams, citing Supreme Court prece-
dent,"' held the seventh amendment applies only to defendants who could
be sued at common law in 1791. Because the commercial vessels of for-
eign states were immune from suit in 1791, actions now brought pursuant
to FSIA would not be within the seventh amendment. The Rex court, in
deciding whether Rex's claim was a suit at common law, did not accept
this static approach to such a "vital constitutional guarantee." 2 Instead,
the court noted that beginning with an 1830 decision, 8 the guarantee has
been held applicable to almost any suit that falls within the federal
court's jurisdiction over suits at law as opposed to suits in equity or admi-
ralty. Since it cannot be maintained that under the common law in 1791
jury trial was a matter of right for persons asserting claims against the
sovereign," there is now no generally applicable jury trial right that at-
taches when the United States consents to suit. The accepted principles
of sovereign immunity require that a jury trial be clearly provided in the
legislation creating the cause of action. Therefore, the relevant inquiry as
focused upon by the Third Circuit is whether the action is in the nature
4. 660 F.2d 61 (3d Cir. 1981).
5. 33 U.S.C. § 905(b) (1972).
6. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976).
8. Id. § 1331(a).
9. Rex v. Cia. Pervana De Vapores, S.A., 493 F. Supp. 459 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
10. See Ruggerio, 639 F.2d at 872 (2d Cir. 1981), and Williams, 653 F.2d at 875 (4th
Cir. 1981).
11. See McElrath v. United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880), and Parsons v. Bedford, 28
U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830).
12. 660 F.2d at 66.
13. Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 446-47.
14. Galloway v. United States, 319 U.S. 372 (1943).
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of a legal remedy provided by statute similar to a suit at common law.",
History conclusively demonstrates that actions against foreign sover-
eigns did not exist at common law, but have only existed exclusively at
the "sufferance of the United States Department of State."' In 1976,
Congress complied with the recommendations of the Departments of
State and Justice to legislate the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity
by enacting the FSIA. In doing so, Congress expressed the intent that
foreign sovereigns not be subject to the jury system."? Congress has spe-
cifically refused to subject the United States to trial by jury.' 8 The court
concluded that by such specific legislation and express intent, the cause
of action under FSIA was not in the nature of a legal remedy at common
law, and significantly, that no jury should intervene. Such denial of jury
trial would not violate the Constitution since no suit at common law" was
being litigated.
Dissenting Judge Soviter agreed that the statute must provide the
sole basis of federal jurisdiction in actions against foreign sovereigns and
that the action must be in the nature of a suit at common law. However,
the dissent would look to the nature of the defendant rather than to the
nature of the plaintiff's claim or rights to determine the existence of a
suit at common law. Specifically, the FSIA should be considered uncon-
stitutional "insofar as it denies plaintiff a jury trial merely because the
defendant is a corporation in which a foreign state owns a controlling
interest."ae0
Despite the strength and logic of the dissenting opinion in Rex, the
rule would now appear to be clearly delineated by at least three circuits.
The significance of the Williams, Ruggerio, and Rex decisions should not
be seen as a cutting back on the restrictive theory of sovereign immu-
nity,2 but rather as an expression of the intent to preserve the basic con-
cept of sovereign immunity and, more importantly, the discretionary de-
terminations of the executive branch of the government as it functions in
the international legal system.
C.J.
15. 660 F.2d at 67.
16. Id. at 68.
17. See Ruggerio, 639 F.2d at 880 n.12; Aldisert, The Nature of the Judicial Process:
Revisted, 49 U. CIN. L. REv. 1, 8-16 (1980).
18. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(a)(2), 2402 (1976).
19. 660 F.2d at 69.
20. Id. at 70.
21. See the Tate Letter, reprinted in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of
China, 425 U.S. 682, 711 (1976).
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